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THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT  
ON THE UKRAINIAN’S FINANCIAL SECTOR 
There are many aspects which are caused by today’s global financial crisis. 
But we’d like to draw your attention to the most important of them according to 
our point of view: on the one hand, its boom and bust in the housing market and its 
impact on the financial market. The crisis began with the bursting of the United 
States housing bubble which peaked in 2005-2006 approximately. Let’s discuss 
two vicious cycles at the heart of the subprime mortgage crisis. The first cycle is 
within the housing market. Voluntary or involuntary foreclosures increase the 
supply of homes, which lowers home prices creating further negative equity. By 
September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20 % from 
their mid-2006 peak. This major and unexpected decline in house prices means that 
many borrowers have zero or negative equity in their homes, meaning their homes 
were worth less than their mortgages. As of March 2008, an estimated 8,8 million 
borrowers – 10,8 % of all homeowners – had negative equity in their homes, a 
number that is believed to have risen to 12 million by November 2008. In this 
situation borrowers have an incentive to “walk away” from their mortgages and 
abandon their homes, even though doing so will damage their credit rating for a 
number of years. The reason is that unlike what is the case in most other countries, 
American residential mortgages are non-recourse loans; once the creditor has 
regained the property purchased with a mortgage in default, he has no further claim 
against the defaulting borrower’s income or assets. As more borrowers stop paying 
their mortgage payments, foreclosures and the supply of homes for sale increase. 
This places downward pressure on housing prices, which further lowers 
homeowners’ equity. The decline in mortgage payments also reduces the value of 
mortgage-backed securities, which erodes the net worth and financial health of 
banks. This vicious cycle is at the heart of the crisis. The second cycle shows that 
foreclosures reduce the cash flowing into banks and the value of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) widely held by banks. Banks incur losses and require additional 
funds (“recapitalization”). If banks are not capitalized sufficiently to lend, 
economic activity slows and unemployment increases, which further increases 
foreclosures. 
On the other hand, as one of the main causes of the crisis we outline financial 
institution debt levels and incentives. In other words, many financial institutions, 
investment banks in particular, issued large amounts of debt during 2004-2007, and 
invested the proceeds in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), essentially betting that 
house prices would continue to rise, and that households would continue to make 
their mortgage payments. Borrowing at a lower interest rate and investing the 
proceeds at a higher interest rate is a form of financial leverage. This is analogous 
process to an individual taking out a second mortgage on his residence to invest in 
the stock market. This strategy proved profitable during the housing boom, but 
resulted in large losses when house prices began to decline and mortgages began to 
default. Beginning in 2007, financial institutions and individual investors holding 
MBS also suffered significant losses from mortgage payment defaults and the 
resulting decline in the value of MBS. Banks faced increasing liquidity needs due 
to commitments arising from the relationship entered into with the issuers of the 
ABS/MBS/CDO’s programs. The result was a dramatic liquidity problem for a 
number of banks, that you can see on the slide. 
All in all, during a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and 
prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields 
without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due 
diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk 
management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products, and 
consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. 
Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not 
adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, pace 
keeping with financial innovation, or taking into account the systemic 
ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.  
Now let me turn to the second part of our report. In the context of the global 
financial crisis the results for Ukraine were as follow: 
 Ukraine is vulnerable due to a combination of large short term debt 
repayments, high current account deficits, and banking weaknesses due to 
non-performing loans and high foreign currency bank liabilities; 
 separately, each of the above factors looks manageable, but their confluence 
amid a deteriorating world economy, easing of steel prices, imminent energy 
price increase, and turbulent domestic politics have notably affected investors 
risk assessment of Ukraine; 
 reflecting these risks, since mid-2008 the premiums for Ukrainian Credit 
Default Swaps have risen to over 2,600 basis points in the mid-October; 
 high risk perceptions of emerging markets translated into a decline in 
portfolio capital inflows to Ukraine: the inflow of portfolio capital declined 
from US$3.3 billion in the first half of 2007 to only $ 350 million in the same 
period of 2008;  
 partly as a result, the PFTS index has declined by more than 75 % year-to-
date (as of October 22, 2008), one of the largest declines in the world. 
So the most important task for Ukraine is to work out a long-term policy with 
the purpose of preventing inflation growth and current balance deficit, optimizing 
state budget expenses, and improving state investment policy.  
And now – lessons to be learnt. In other words, what can government, the 
NBU and business do. Concluding all above information, we’d like to give some 
advices.  
What can the government do? As to the given risks of reductions in export-
oriented production due to weakening global demand and problems with payments 
under export transactions, the government should work to stimulate domestic 
demand for the group of export goods and, thus, enhance the role of domestic 
production. It can start with launching a new infrastructure and residential 
construction projects funded from the state budget. The government should prevent 
a sharp decline in grain prices by urging the Agrarian Fund to purchase grain of 
this year’s harvest. It will provide agricultural producers with sufficient resources 
to prepare and carry out the sowing campaign. It will also support, directly and 
indirectly, the development of metallurgy, coke production, the mining industry, 
oil refining, the chemical industry, the food processing industry, trade and 
transport. 
In order to manage the financial instability risk, it is strongly advisable to 
revise the draft 2009 budget so as to increase capital expenditures, including in 
construction, without increasing the budget deficit. It is also important to set up a 
Stabilization Fund that will cover all governmental guarantees, which will gain 
more confidence in the governmental commitment to pursue a well-balanced and 
sound budget policy. 
During the financial crisis, the government’s strategy is to encourage 
investments into the real sector of the economy. Consequently, alongside with 
accelerating the implementation of projects related to Euro-2012, we should 
unblock privatization processes. The government cannot do that alone, we need 
support from the Verkhovna Rada to get the State Privatization Program adopted. 
The Parliament should also pass a package of laws drafted by the government and 
geared towards boosting Ukraine’s investment attractiveness. 
What can NBU do? In order to prevent a banking crisis, NBU should establish 
principles of refinancing commercial banks that have short-term liquidity problems 
for the period of financial crisis. A currency crisis can be averted with a series of 
measures precluding the exchange rate destabilization by speculators. NBU should 
continue to pursue the policy of increasing the rate volatility in order to reduce 
risks to the balance of payments. 
What can businesses and investors do? Given the limited financial resources 
inside the country and shrinking access to foreign loans, businesses face a difficult 
choice: either to suspend production and lose markets, maintaining high prices in 
expectation of better times, or to reduce prices trying to restore demand and keep 
consumers. The later option is for those manufacturers who care about their future, 
expansion and economy of scale; the former is for profiteers who make large 
money quickly and drop the production. 
 
